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A New York judge leaves Novig's sports contracts under state gambling law.

The exchange appealed the same day. The order does not reach harm, equities or the public interest.

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An empty sportsbook counter at night, two stacks of chips facing each other on crimson felt, with gold light and teal and magenta screens.
Our picture. It is not a photograph from the source. The frame is this paper's mark.
The order
10 November 2026. Southern District of New York, No. 1:26-cv-06676 (CM), Document 73, 35 pages. Judge Colleen McMahon. Preliminary injunction denied. The motion at docket 23 is terminated.
The holding
The sports contracts depend on an event or a contingency. They are not swaps under 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii), because that event is not associated with a financial, economic or commercial consequence in the statute's sense. They sit outside the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's exclusive jurisdiction.
What the state may do
Apply its gambling and sports-wagering laws. Require a state gambling licence, or prohibit listing and trading of the contracts on Novig's designated contract market.
The path here
Designation as a contract market on 16 June 2026. New York sports contracts announced 4 August. Complaint 5 August. Injunction motion 6 August. Temporary restraining order denied 11 August. Notice of appeal, Document 74, filed 10 November to the Second Circuit.
Not decided
Irreparable harm, the balance of equities and the public interest. No final judgment. This desk has not opened the Second Circuit summary order that New York filed as supplemental authority on 5 November.

Judge Colleen McMahon of the Southern District of New York denied Novig a preliminary injunction on 10 November 2026. The plaintiff is Ludlow Exchange, LLC, doing business as Novig. The defendants are Attorney General Letitia James, Gaming Commission executive director Robert Williams, chair Brian O’Dwyer, and commissioners Peter J. Moschetti Jr., John A. Crotty, Sylvia B. Hamer, Martin J. Mack, Marissa Shorenstein and Jerry Skurnik, each in an official capacity. Gambling Insider reported the ruling the next morning. This desk opened the 35-page opinion and the notice of appeal filed the same day.

Novig runs an online exchange for sports event contracts. A customer takes one side of a result. A trade prints when a buyer and a seller meet at the same price. The exchange does not stand on the other side of the trade. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission designated Ludlow a contract market on 16 June 2026. On 4 August Novig said sports contracts were available to customers in New York. It sued the next day, and moved for a preliminary injunction on 6 August. The opinion says the suit was brought in anticipation of enforcement. As the court recounts that history, the Gaming Commission had already told Kalshi in October 2025 to stop offering what the commission treated as an unlicensed mobile sportsbook, the attorney general had sued Coinbase Financial Markets and Gemini Titan in April 2026, and the state had begun an enforcement case against Kalshi on 31 July 2026.

The court had already refused a temporary restraining order on 11 August. The November opinion is the ruling on the fuller motion. McMahon holds that the contracts are not swaps under the Commodity Exchange Act. A swap, in the clause Novig relied on, is a contract whose payment depends on an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic or commercial consequence. She accepts the first half. A Giants win by 2.5 points, a player’s touchdown, a side of the total: each is an event that happens or does not. She rejects the second half. Congress wrote that phrase for markets that move price risk, the crop future being the statute’s original case. A sports contract, in her account, creates a risk for a customer who wants the result. It does not hedge one. Because the contracts are not swaps, they fall outside the commission’s exclusive jurisdiction, and the Act does not expressly preempt New York’s gambling laws.

She read the product off Novig’s own board, as it stood on 5 November. Beside the winner of a game, the exchange listed spreads, totals, parlays and player props. One parlay on four underdogs, which the opinion names from the app, paid 111.11 times the stake: $100 would have returned $11,111.11 if every leg had won. All four lost. The same positions, she writes, can be taken on a FanDuel or BetMGM sportsbook. The opinion quotes a company line from the state’s papers, pinned to docket 52-17: the aim is to be the largest sports-betting platform in the world. Two further lines in the same passage, drawn from those exhibits, say the federal government legalised sports betting in every state through an exchange, and that the mission is to democratise and financialise sports betting. Her conclusion in that passage is that the contracts are sports betting, and that a court is not required to set common sense aside to see it.

New York’s side of the rule is set out in the opinion. The state constitution still bars gambling except where the constitution itself allows it. The Penal Law defines a wager as staking something of value on a contest of chance, or on a future contingent event the person does not control, under an agreement to be paid if a given outcome arrives. The Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law says no one may offer a mobile sports-wagering platform to people in the state without a commission licence, and no one may operate, advertise or promote an unlicensed platform to people located there. On the court’s reading of the injunction standard, New York may apply those laws by requiring a licence or by prohibiting the listing and trading of the contracts on Novig’s market.

McMahon adds a second path, in case a higher court decides the contracts are swaps after all. Even then, she writes, exclusive jurisdiction does not hand the state every duty over to the federal commission. The state may not take over the licensing and operation of the exchange itself. It may apply gambling law to the betting conducted there. She rejects field preemption and conflict preemption on that assumed basis. Novig had argued it could not comply with both regimes, and it pointed to a Commodity Futures Trading Commission order of 11 August 2026 telling Kalshi to keep its exchange running while the attorney general sought to stop sports-contract listings. McMahon describes that order as an effort by a regulator and a regulated firm to manufacture a conflict, and she declines to treat it as one. She also notes that the regulation now in force, 17 C.F.R. § 40.11, prohibits event contracts that relate to gaming, and she gives no weight to a proposed amendment that is not yet law.

The compliance objection fails, in the opinion’s words, because an alternative exists. Novig could take a New York gambling licence, as it did in Colorado. The complaint, as the court recites it, says the parent pursued state licensure, obtained an internet sports-betting operator licence in Colorado in 2023, and later returned it to run an exchange under the federal statute. Ludlow itself was formed on 14 October 2025 to be that contract market. The parent dates to 2021. The exchange is headquartered in New York. A geofence limiting service to people physically in the state would, the court says, leave the designated contract market in operation. The Penal Law offence of keeping gambling records reaches activity the law has not authorised. A licence would be that authorisation. If Novig wants a national book, the opinion says, it can seek a licence in each state that allows sports betting, and it points to FanDuel’s sportsbook being offered in 24 states.

The order stops at likelihood of success. A preliminary injunction in this circuit also requires irreparable harm, a balance of equities in the plaintiff’s favour, and a public interest in the relief. McMahon does not reach those three. The clerk is directed to terminate the motion. The paper says it is a written decision. It is not a final judgment, and it does not itself assess a penalty or close a customer account. Novig’s notice of appeal, Document 74, dated 10 November and filed by Sullivan & Cromwell, asks the Second Circuit to review the denial.

On 5 November the state had told the court that a Second Circuit motions panel, in a non-precedential summary order, had denied injunctions pending appeal in consolidated cases brought by Kalshi and Coinbase. The opinion says a merits panel will hear that question and that no argument date had been set. This desk has not opened that summary order. The Gambling Insider wire that carried the Novig ruling also carried other items from the same day. This note is the New York order only.

Sources

  1. Gambling Insider, 11 November 2026
  2. Opinion and order, Ludlow Exchange, LLC v. James, No. 1:26-cv-06676, Document 73
  3. Notice of appeal, Document 74