A filed suspicion moves only with the FIU's agreement.
At SiGMA World in Rome, Europol and Italy's financial police told iGaming Business the gap is speed. Article 78 makes the firm answer the unit quickly. The article does not make the unit answer the firm.
- The room
- iGaming Business, 13 November 2026. Giuseppe Lopez, head of Europol's European Financial and Economic Crime Centre; Francesco Venditti of the Guardia di Finanza; Jason Sandoval of Asset Reality; Pierre Tournier, interim secretary general of the European Gaming and Betting Association. The paper places the conversation at SiGMA World in Rome the week before. This desk has not opened a programme, an Europol page, or a page for any of the four offices.
- The regulation
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of 31 May 2024, Official Journal L 2024/1624, 19 June 2024. English text. A request for the HTML on EUR-Lex stopped on a challenge page. Article 90: in force on the twentieth day after publication, and applicable from 10 July 2027. Football agents and professional football clubs follow on 10 July 2029.
- The pipe
- Article 2(1)(57) and Article 75. A partnership shares information between obliged entities and, where they take part, a financial intelligence unit, a supervisor, or an authority that investigates, prosecutes, or traces and freezes criminal assets. Sharing is only where strictly necessary for customer due diligence under Chapter III and for reporting under Article 69. The firm notifies its supervisor before the partnership starts. The supervisor checks the safeguards. A data-protection impact assessment comes first.
- The gate
- Article 75(3)(g) and (4)(k). Information on suspicions under Article 69 may be exchanged only where the financial intelligence unit that received the report agrees. A firm may not rely on partnership information alone, and may not refuse or end a relationship on it without its own assessment. Information produced by artificial intelligence may be shared only with human oversight. What comes in is not passed on, except into a report to the unit, to another obliged entity under Article 49(1), to the Anti-Money Laundering Authority under Article 93 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, or to law enforcement or a court where national law allows the request. This desk has not opened Regulation (EU) 2024/1620.
- Gambling
- Article 3(3)(g) lists providers of gambling services as obliged entities. Article 4 lets a member state exempt some gambling on a proven low risk. The exemption cannot cover casinos, or a firm whose principal activity is online gambling or sports betting, unless the state operates that online service or regulates its organisation, operation and administration. Article 19(5): customer due diligence when winnings collected, a stake wagered, or both, reach at least €2,000, including linked transactions.
- The survey
- Sumsub newsroom, 24 June 2025, on its State of Identity Verification in the iGaming Industry 2025. The body says 82.9 percent of operators reported an increase in fraud over the past year, and 41.9 percent named the deposit stage as the main point. A separate line says 83 percent experienced fraud. Sumsub's own Europe fraud rate moves from 1.18 percent to 1.24 percent, which it prints as a 5.1 percent increase. Dividing 1.24 by 1.18 and subtracting one gives 5.1 percent. These are the vendor's figures. Sandoval's remark of about five million unanalysed reports is left out of the count.
At SiGMA World in Rome, European investigators told iGaming Business that money in gambling now moves faster than the agencies that follow it. The report is dated 13 November 2026 and places the conversation in the week before. Giuseppe Lopez, head of Europol’s European Financial and Economic Crime Centre, Francesco Venditti of Italy’s Guardia di Finanza, Jason Sandoval of Asset Reality, and Pierre Tournier of the European Gaming and Betting Association are the four voices. This desk opened that report and the English text of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624. A request for the HTML on EUR-Lex stopped on a challenge page, so the clauses below are from Official Journal L 2024/1624 of 19 June 2024. This desk has not opened a show programme, an Europol page, or a page for any of the four offices.
Lopez’s point, as the paper records it, is that fraud is getting faster, that gambling is one of the areas where Europol works against money laundering, and that much of the raw material arrives as suspicious-transaction reports. He wants operators to hear back, so they can see which anomalies become a lead. Sandoval, a former investigator with the US Drug Enforcement Administration who now runs European work for a firm that helps authorities hold and sell seized assets, wants that reply written in as a duty. He also says a cross-border legal-assistance request can take six months, by which time the money is gone, and he puts the stock of reports still unanalysed at about five million, with the number left loose. This desk does not treat that five million as a count. Venditti, whose unit at the financial police works on technological fraud, says crypto gambling is taking a larger share and that blockchain payments to unlicensed sites are hard to follow. His account of the work is to trace the crypto, freeze or seize it where the law allows, and take the sites down. He contrasts sites that let a player check a result on a chain with sites licensed by ADM, which the article identifies as Italy’s customs and monopolies agency. Tournier, interim secretary general of the operators’ association in Brussels, says a lobby that asks for lighter rules gets a cold hearing, and that a request to enforce the law against unlicensed operators is an easier conversation.
The trade paper presents Article 75 of the new anti-money-laundering regulation as the machinery for that conversation. It says the article lets public and private bodies, gambling operators among them, exchange information for operational purposes, if an authority that is still finding its feet can make the channel work. The text this desk read is narrower, and it is not yet in application.
Article 90 puts the regulation into force on the twentieth day after publication and applies it from 10 July 2027. Football agents and professional football clubs wait until 10 July 2029. Article 2(1)(57) defines a partnership for information sharing as a mechanism, in whatever form, for sharing and processing information between obliged entities and, where they take part, the competent authorities in point (44)(a), (b) and (c). Those three are a financial intelligence unit, a supervisory authority, and a public authority that investigates or prosecutes money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing, or that traces, seizes, freezes and confiscates criminal assets. Article 75(1) allows members to share information only where it is strictly necessary for the customer-due-diligence duties in Chapter III and for the reporting duty in Article 69, and only in line with fundamental rights and judicial safeguards.
A firm that wants to join tells its supervisor first. Article 75(2) has that supervisor, consulting other supervisors and the data-protection authority where that is relevant, check that the partnership can meet the article and that the data-protection impact assessment has been done. The check comes before the partnership starts work. The supervisor consults the financial intelligence units where that is relevant. Compliance stays with the participants.
The list of what may move is closed. Article 75(3) allows customer identity, including the beneficial owner; the purpose and intended nature of the relationship or the one-off transaction, and where it applies the source of wealth and of funds; customer transactions; higher and lower risk factors; the firm’s own risk analysis under Article 20(2); records the firm keeps under Article 77(1); and information on suspicions under Article 69. Each item moves only as far as the partnership’s work requires.
The conditions in Article 75(4) are the part the Rome conversation does not carry. Every share is recorded. A firm must not comply by relying only on what the partnership handed it. It must not refuse a customer, end a relationship, or block a one-off transaction on that information without assessing it itself, and a decision that uses the shared material has to say so in the record. It still makes its own judgement of which transactions may be laundering, terrorist financing, or the proceeds of crime. Sharing is limited to customers already marked higher risk in the Union or national risk assessment, customers who fall under the enhanced-due-diligence situations in Articles 29, 30, 31 and 36 to 46, or customers for whom the firm still needs more information to decide whether the risk is higher. Information produced by artificial intelligence, machine learning or an algorithm may be shared only where a person has supervised that process. Where the information is a suspicion under Article 69, and a report has been sent under Article 69 or 70, the exchange happens only if the financial intelligence unit that received the report agrees. An investigating authority that sits in the partnership handles personal data and operational information under the national law that transposes Directive (EU) 2016/680 and under national criminal procedure, including any prior judicial authorisation that law requires.
Article 75(5) then stops the information from travelling further. The exceptions are a pass to another obliged entity under Article 49(1), material that goes into a report to the financial intelligence unit or that answers a request from it, a pass to the Anti-Money Laundering Authority under Article 93 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, and a request from law enforcement or a court where national law requires a prior authorisation or another safeguard. This desk has not opened Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, so the Authority’s own power to set up a cross-border partnership stays outside this note. Before a firm joins, Article 75(6) requires written policies on how much is shared, who does what, and which risk assessments mark a case as higher risk. A supervisor can require an independent audit.
Gambling sits inside that machinery as an obliged entity. Article 3(3)(g) names providers of gambling services. Article 4 lets a member state exempt some of them, in full or in part, on a proven low risk, after an assessment of threats, transaction size, payment methods and geography. The exemption cannot cover a casino. It also cannot cover a firm whose principal activity is online gambling or sports betting, except where the state itself operates the online service or regulates how that service is organised, operated and administered. Article 19(5) adds a trigger of its own: customer due diligence when the firm collects winnings, takes a stake, or both, once the transactions reach at least €2,000, or the same sum in national currency, in one go or linked. Recital 64 says the firm should be able to tie those transactions to a customer before identity is verified, so it can see when the threshold is crossed. In a physical hall, identity may be checked at the door if the chips and the play can still be tied to that person.
Two further articles set the direction of the speed the officials asked for. Article 69(8) says that if the partnership’s own work produces knowledge or a suspicion that funds are criminal proceeds or linked to terrorist financing, the firms that saw it in their own customers may pick one of them to file the report. The report names every firm that took part. Firms in several member states report to each relevant unit, through a firm established in that state. If they each file instead, each report says the suspicion came out of a partnership. Recital 149 says the partnership does not replace the report, and that information pointing to a suspicion stays under stricter rules because the unit’s work and the investigation have to stay confidential. Article 78 then requires the firm to answer an enquiry from its unit, or from another competent authority, fully and speedily, on whether it held a relationship with a named person in the past five years. The speed written into the regulation runs from the firm to the unit.
The figures in the iGaming Business piece are from a Sumsub newsroom note of 24 June 2025, which this desk opened. The body says 82.9 percent of operators in its survey reported an increase in fraud over the past year, and 41.9 percent named the deposit stage as the main point of attack. A separate line on the same page says 83 percent experienced fraud, which is a different question from an increase. Sumsub’s own table of fraud rates, which it distinguishes from the survey, moves Europe from 1.18 percent to 1.24 percent and prints that as a 5.1 percent increase. Dividing 1.24 by 1.18 and subtracting one gives 5.1 percent. The steep move on that table is Latin America, from 0.88 percent to 1.16 percent. None of these is a supervisor’s count. They are the vendor’s.